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Most economic analyses of climate change have focused on the aggregate impact on countries of mitigation 
actions. We depart first in disaggregating the impact by sector, focusing particularly on manufacturing output 
and exports because of the potential growth consequences.  Second, we decompose the impact of an agreement 
on emissions reductions into three components: the change in the price of carbon due to each country’s 
emission cuts per se; the further change in this price due to emissions tradability; and the changes due to 
any international transfers (private and public).  Manufacturing output and exports in low carbon intensity 
countries such as Brazil are not adversely affected. In contrast, in high carbon intensity countries, such as 
China and India, even a modest agreement depresses manufacturing output by 6-7 percent and manufacturing 
exports by 9-11 percent. The increase in the carbon price induced by emissions tradability hurts manufacturing 
output most while the Dutch disease effects of transfers hurt exports most.  If the growth costs of these 
structural changes are judged to be substantial, the current policy consensus, which favors emissions tradability 
(on efficiency grounds) supplemented with financial transfers (on equity grounds), needs re-consideration.
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I. Introduction  
 
Leading up to Copenhagen, the focus of discussions has been on how much emissions should be 
cut and how developing countries should be compensated for any cuts they make. Accordingly, 
much of the literature has focused on the aggregate costs to countries of climate change 
mitigation actions, and the transfers that would be necessary to maintain welfare in the poorer 
parts of the world. However, the structural implications of these actions have received less 
attention.  Has the justified focus on remedying the carbon externality made us overlook a 
possible growth externality for some developing countries?  
 
In this paper, we seek to make a twofold contribution.  On outcomes, we focus on manufacturing 
exports as well as on manufacturing output both in the aggregate and in selected sectors. On 
policy, we isolate the impact of three distinct actions—emissions reductions per se; emissions 
tradability; and transfers.  
 
Why the focus on manufacturing?  If it were unambiguously clear that manufacturing had no 
special role in the development process, and did not generate positive growth externalities, there 
would be no need to focus on manufacturing. A static analysis focusing on the aggregate effects 
of climate change actions would then be sufficient. But the literature is ambivalent: there is a 
body that argues in favor of positive growth benefits from manufacturing output and/or exports 
while others are more skeptical.
1 The paper is agnostic about both views. But insofar as there is 
some merit in the view that manufacturing matters, policy makers will want to take that into 
account, creating a need for a disaggregated analysis of the kind that we provide in this paper.  
 
The policy disaggregation is useful because each dimension of policy may have different effects 
and, moreover, affect different countries differently.  For example, the impact of emissions 
reductions varies across countries depending on the carbon intensity of their production.  
Furthermore, the transfers that arise from tradability themselves have growth consequences and 
need to be evaluated. The rich literatures on aid and growth, and financial globalization and 
growth are ambivalent: while many studies find either some positive or no effects, others suggest 
that under some conditions both public and private transfers may have negative effects on 
growth.
2 This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by providing some evidence on the 
structural impact of transfers.  
 
The literature on the costs of climate change mitigation is voluminous and includes a number of 
important contributions (Cline 2007, IMF 2007, Nordhaus 2007, Stern 2007, UNDP 2007, and 
                                                 
1 Recent proponents of this view include Jones and Olken (2007), Rodrik (2010), and Johnson, Ostry and 
Subramanian (2010).   
2 The skeptical view of aid and growth can be found in Brautigam and Knack 2004, Collier 2007, Collier 2008, 
Djankov et al. 2005,; and Easterly (2007), Moyo (2009), Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2007, Elbadawi 1999, 
Knack 2001, Prati and Tressel 2006, Rajan and Subramanian (2008, 2010). The skeptical view of financial 
globalization (i.e private net flows) and growth can be found in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007), Prasad et al. (2008) 
and Rogoff et al. (2004). 
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World Bank 2009). This literature recognizes that a regime that favors static efficiency through 
uniform global prices can be inequitable and therefore typically recommends financial and 
technology transfers to alleviate the adverse effects on developing countries (Stern (2007) and 
the World Bank‘s World Development Report (2009)). Hardly explored is the potential tension 
between static efficiency and dynamic effects, stemming from changes in the composition of 
output and exports in developing countries as a result of uniform global prices. The fact that 
transfers can themselves accentuate this tension through Dutch disease type effects, while 
acknowledged (Strand 2009), has also not been fully explored.  
 
Hence, for many of the vital policy questions that are the subject of this paper, there are today no 
good answers based on empirical research. An econometric approach seems handicapped by the 
absence of past events and our inability to construct experiments which are comparable with the 
policy changes of greatest interest.  We therefore use a multi-country, multi-sector CGE model to 
derive our quantitative estimates. In situations of simultaneous policy changes of the kind that 
we consider in this paper, in which there could be significant interaction among the policies of 
different countries, and where we are interested in quantifying the effects of policy change on 
output and trade in different sectors of the economy, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
approach seems appropriate (Kehoe et. al., 2005).   
 
We focus on the case where developing countries cut their emissions by 30 per cent by 2020 
relative to projected business-as-usual (BAU) levels (China already plans a 20 per cent cut in 
energy intensity), which may then lead industrial countries to cut their emissions by 30 per cent 
in 2020 relative to 2005 levels (reflecting the EU‘s recent conditional offer).  We also consider a 
broad range of other scenarios. 
 
Our main empirical findings, which come with a number of important caveats we discuss in 
Section IV, are the following.  Some currently high carbon intensity countries/regions (such as 
China, India, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), and Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA)) will experience substantial reductions in manufacturing output and exports from 
emissions reductions per se.
3  For a sub-set of these countries, especially China and India, these 
effects will be aggravated by emissions tradability (especially on manufacturing output) and 
transfers (especially on manufacturing exports).  For this sub-set, the negative effects will be 
substantial not just for carbon-intensive manufacturing but also other manufacturing sectors. For 
example, for China and India, the aggregate effect of all these policy actions would be a decline 
in manufacturing output of 6-7 percent, and in manufacturing exports by 9-11 percent. These 
effects would be aggravated if these developing countries pursued more ambitious emissions 
targets. There could also be transitional dislocation costs as resources are re-allocated across 
sectors. 
 
In contrast, the manufacturing sector in low carbon intensity countries (such as Brazil and Latin 
America) will be minimally affected by actions related to climate change. In the case of sub-
                                                 
3 For a list of countries falling in the different groupings, see Appendix Table 1a. 3 
 
Saharan Africa, effects might even be positive, although any boost to manufacturing exports 
could be reduced through transfers and the consequent Dutch-disease-type effects. 
 
These findings could have implications for the positions that countries will adopt in international 
negotiations.  Amongst economists there is a strong consensus that the best way forward is to get 
a uniform global carbon price—either via a common global tax or international emissions 
trading—supplemented with financial transfers to address the equity dimension of climate 
change. This article of faith in the policy community was captured by the Financial Times in its 
leader of November 3 when it asserted that the price of carbon, ―…must be high and the same 
everywhere. …In the actual world, a global scheme of tradable emissions quotas is the best 
solution.‖  
 
If there are no growth externalities from shrunken manufacturing exports and output, this view 
would have considerable merit because individual countries and international cooperative efforts 
have to deal with only one externality—the carbon externality. But if climate change actions, by 
affecting manufacturing, reduce long-run growth, two externalities—carbon and growth—will 
have to be reconciled in ways we discuss briefly in the final section. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the emissions reductions scenarios 
which we believe have greatest relevance for policy, and briefly discuss the positions that the 
United States (US) and European Union (EU) have taken on a key issue, the international 
tradability of emissions rights. In section III, we spell out the simple analytics of emissions 
reductions, international tradability of emissions and transfers. In section IV, we present the 
results of our quantitative simulations of each of the scenarios. Section V provides a concluding 
assessment of the implications of our result. 
 
II. The Scenarios  
 
Our basic scenario is one where high income countries cut their emissions by 30 percent by 2020 
relative to levels in 2005, and developing countries cut their emissions by 30 percent by 2020 
relative to levels in business-as-usual.
4 The 30 per cent reduction in high income countries 
reflects the EU‘s announcement that it would be willing to implement this higher cut if other 
countries also participated in cooperative action. Developing country reductions reflect recent 
statements of intent.  For example, China recently announced that it plans to extend the pledge 
announced in its last five-year plan to cut energy use per unit of economic output by 20 per cent.
5 
India too has announced a range of initiatives even though it has not yet announced a quantitative 
target.
6  We also consider a range of cuts by developing countries to test the robustness of our 
results. 
                                                 
4 This would entail agreeing on a hypothetical baseline for emissions. However, what matters most is the binding of 
emissions themselves at some level that would yield a positive carbon tax. 
5 See, ―Beijing in Pledge to Spur Energy Efficiency,‖ Financial Times, September 23, 2009. 
6 These include a National Action Plan on Climate Change (http://moef.nic.in/downloads/home/Pg01-52.pdf) and 
Twenty Recent Initiatives Related to Climate Change (http://moef.nic.in/downloads/home/twenty-CC-
initiatives.pdf). 4 
 
In addition to emissions cuts, recent initiatives envisage international tradability of emissions 
rights. In the US, bills in the House and Senate differ slightly. The House version would limit the 
amount of total emissions rights that are internationally tradable to a maximum of one-half of the 
2 billion tons of CO2 that can be traded, with the remaining half being traded domestically. In 
the Senate version, a maximum of one-quarter of the 2 billion can be traded internationally.
7  
 
The Council of the European Union has recently moved in favor of international tradability. It 
would like to see: ―preferably by no later than 2015, a robust OECD-wide carbon market through 
the linking of cap-and-trade systems which are comparable in ambition and compatible in design, 
to be extended to economically more advanced developing countries by 2020.‖
8 
 
In order to capture the effects of both emissions cuts and tradability, we consider four variants of 
the basic scenario (see Table 1). First, where cuts are implemented but emissions are not tradable 
and there are no international transfers (NTER). Second, where cuts are complemented with 
emissions tradability which leads to a uniform global carbon price, but we abstract from the 
implied private transfers (TER1); this scenario is equivalent a uniform global carbon tax regime 
where the taxes are retained domestically rather than being transferred across countries. The third 
scenario differs from the second in allowing for private transfers (TER) and this represents what 
will actually happen with full tradability of emissions; this scenario is equivalent to a uniform 
global carbon tax regime with revenues transferred across countries. Finally, we consider a 
scenario where supplementary public transfers are made to compensate developing countries so 
that they attain the same welfare levels as in the business-as-usual case (TERWMT). This might 
not seem realistic given the political infeasibility of generating support for large public transfers 
to countries such as China and India. But we use this scenario primarily as an illustrative 
benchmark and also to see the impact on some of the poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for 
whom large public transfers remain politically feasible.  
 
III. Simple analytics of Cooperative Emissions Cuts, Tradability, and Transfers 
 




We can think of emissions (E) as an input in the production of a single composite commodity 
with a simple production function assumed to be given over the relatively short horizon that we 
consider in this paper.
 9 
 
We depict the equilibrium for the world in Figure 1.  V and V
* represent the value of marginal 
products of emissions (i.e., the price of the output times the marginal physical product of 
emissions) for the two countries, say the poor and rich, respectively. Emissions are measured 
                                                 
7 The Senate version also has a stipulation that, after 2018, 1.25 international offset credits would be required to 
equal one allowance of domestic offset credit. 
8 See  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/106429.pdf. 
9 See e.g. Panagariya (2009). 5 
 
from the origin O for the poor country and O* for the rich country. In the pre-emissions 
situation, we assume that the price of emissions is zero in both countries. In each country the 
equilibrium is where the marginal benefit of emissions equals the zero price of emissions. This 
occurs at E, resulting in an initial level of world emissions of OO
*, with OE the emissions level 
of the poor and O*E the emissions level of the rich.  
 





A global agreement on climate change will involve, first, a reduction in global emissions. 
Assuming that emissions in the poor country are to be reduced by OO1 and in the rich by O
*O1
*, 
there are two ways of achieving it: through a cap or through taxes. A cap can be represented as a 
shift of the origin for both countries, from O to O1 for the poor and from O
* to O1
* for the rich. 
The corresponding V schedules are shifted appropriately for the two countries. The price of 
emissions now rise to P1
* in the rich country and P1 in the poor. Note that this differentiated 
global carbon price regime could also have been achieved through differential taxes in the rich 
and poor respectively equal to O
*P1
* and OP1. These emissions reductions will lead to cuts in 
output equal to the area DEH in the poor country and the area FEJ in the rich country (recall that 
output is the area under the value of marginal product curve). 
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The required reduction in global emissions can also be achieved through a uniform global carbon 
price regime. In this case, what is needed is a common tax of OPu, which implies emissions equal 
to O1B in the poor country and O1
*B in the rich. The same outcome can be achieved by allowing 
international emissions tradability which would lead to arbitrage and establishment of a uniform 
global price equal to OPu. This means that the price rises from P1 to Pu in the poor country and 
falls from P1
* to Pu in the rich country.  Because of these price changes, there is a change in 
aggregate production activity in the rich and poor countries. In the latter, the sale of emission 
rights implies that output falls further by an amount represented by the area ABED, so that 
output declines overall by the area ABH. In the rich country, on the other hand, the purchase of 
the emission rights means that output expands by the area ABEF, so that the output declines 
overall by the area ABJ.  In other words, tradability accentuates the emission reduction-induced 
output cuts in the poor country and ameliorates the output cuts in the rich country.   
 
Of course, world output expands (by AFD) because the gains in the rich country outweigh the 
losses in the poor country. Tradability ensures more efficient allocation of world resources.  
Furthermore, tradability ensures that the loss in output for the poor country will be more than 
compensated by the financial transfers that will automatically occur as a result of tradability. 
Rich country holders of emissions permits will buy EB from holders of such permits in the poor 
country, resulting in a financial transfer represented by the rectangle ABEC. Net welfare in the 
poor country will therefore increase with tradability by the amount ACD, which is the difference 
between the lost output and the additional financial transfers. Conversely, in the rich country, 
aggregate welfare net of the transfer would rise by the triangle ACF. The world as a whole is 
better off.  
 
Compositional  effects 
 
In addition to the negative impact on aggregate economic activity, emission cuts and the 
tradability of emissions also affect the composition of economic activity.  In Figure 2, F0F0 
depicts the initial production possibility frontier (PPF) of a developing country:  the economy 
produces manufactured (M) goods and other tradable goods (A) and faces international prices 
reflected in the relative price line, P0P0.  It produces at point A and consumes at point B, 
attaining welfare level W0.  In this initial equilibrium, the economy exports M and imports A. 
We have seen above that emission cuts combined with tradable permits lead to a contraction in 
the ―emission endowments‖ of developing countries.  The production of M is assumed to be 
energy intensive relative to the production of A (this is confirmed in Appendix Table 7 which 
provides data on carbon intensity of the different sectors across the world).  The result of the 
emission cuts is an inward shift in the PPF, from F0F0 to F1F1, which is more pronounced in the 
vicinity of the axis measuring the output of energy-intensive M.  With unchanged world prices, 
this shift is likely to lead to a cut in M output and increase in A output (which follows from the 
Rybczynski Theorem).  But international prices are likely to change.  If M were to become 
relatively more expensive (because at the global level, supply of relatively energy-intensive 
goods will decline) then the change in prices is likely to encourage the country‘s production of 
M.  If the country‘s production of M is energy intensive relative to the rest of the world, then it is 7 
 
likely that the Rybczynski effect will dominate the relative price effect, and the share of M in 
total output will contract –i.e. the new point at which the economy produces, C, will be to the 
right of the line passing between the origin and the original production point, A.   
In this new equilibrium, without any transfers, the economy consumes at D, attaining a lower 
level of welfare, W1.Transfers from the rest of the world, in the form of payments for emission 
rights, could of course lead to an outward shift in the economy‘s ―budget constraint‖ and 
compensate for the loss in welfare, so that post-transfers its budget line is P2P2, and it attains a 
level of welfare W3.  How far a country attains remains from its initial (pre-emission cuts) level 
of welfare, W0, will depend on the magnitude of public and private transfers.   
 
Figure 2: Resource Allocation Effects of Emission Cuts and Trading 
 
 
Thus far, the analysis has focused on static effects. But emissions cuts and tradability of emission 
rights will also have dynamic effects through transfers and changes in the composition of 
economic activity. If a significant proportion of the transfers is invested in enhancing the 
economy‘s productive capacity, then it is conceivable that the contraction in the PPF could be 
eventually offset.  But if transfers are mostly devoted to maintaining consumption, then the 
economy would suffer a durable contraction in productive capacity.  Perhaps, more importantly, 
the induced shift away from manufacturing to other sectors could hurt growth if the former offers 
greater scope for productivity improvements than the latter.    
IV. Quantifying economic effects under cooperative reductions 
 
For many of the vital policy questions that are the subject of this paper, there are today no good 
answers based on empirical research. An econometric approach seems handicapped by the 
absence of past events and our inability to construct experiments which are comparable with the 8 
 
policy changes of greatest interest.  In situations of simultaneous policy changes of the kind that 
we consider in this paper, in which there could be significant interaction effects among different 
countries, and where we are interested in quantifying the effects of these changes on output and 
trade in different sectors of the economy, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach 
seems appropriate (Kehoe et. al., 2005).   
 
The quantitative results presented in this paper rely on a specific CGE model that has been 
developed at the World Bank, known as the Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied 
General Equilibrium Model, or the ENVISAGE model.
10 The primary purpose of the 
ENVISAGE model is to assess the growth and structural impacts for developing countries from 
climate change itself and policies to address climate change—either unilaterally or in an 
international agreement.  
 
Any quantitative analysis in this field will conditional on assumptions regarding exogenous 
developments (for example the future cost of alternative technologies), key parameter values (for 
example intra-fuel substitution elasticities) and model specification (for example carbon tax 
revenue recycling). Our quantitative exercise is meant to be illustrative of the signs and broad 
magnitudes of effects, rather than be taken as definitive in any way.  The reader should 
nonetheless keep in mind certain caveats regarding the model and its results.  
 
First, and foremost, the model is not equipped to quantify any of the welfare benefits from 
emissions reductions per se and does not take account of emissions related to forestry. 
 
Second, the modeling does not take into account any pre-existing subsidies or other distortions in 
developing country energy markets whose elimination could provide opportunities for emission 
abatement.  The OECD (2009) has calculated the fuel subsidies in a number of developing 
economies. Most of these are consumption rather than production subsidies and, although they 
vary across fuel types and income groups, their average value is relatively low (for example, less 
than 3 percent for China). This suggests that eliminating these subsidies will have positive 
welfare consequences that our results do not incorporate. However, the fact that the magnitudes 
are low would suggest that our results relating to compositional changes may not be significantly 
affected. 
 
Third, the model is not able to represent the full range of available alternative technologies, and 
so may tend to exaggerate the output and trade responses as energy prices rise with emission 
limits.  But some features of the model may limit the biases on this score.  We allow for 
exogenous improvements in manufacturing energy efficiency through the accumulation of more 
advanced capital stock.  Also, the current version of the ENVISAGE model does allow for 
limited substitution between technologies. For example, it allows for switching to alternative 
                                                 
10 The model has several distinguishing features: a focus on developing countries and significant sectoral 
disaggregation; an integrated climate module that generates changes in global mean temperature based on emissions 
of four greenhouse gases; and economic damage functions linked to changes in temperature. A summary description 
of the model and the key assumptions are provided in the Technical Appendix and van der Mensbrugghe (2009) 
provides a full description of the model. 9 
 
(and cleaner) technologies in the power sector, albeit in limited fashion.
11  The model also allows 
for some substitution to natural gas in the transportation sector but not to biofuels and only to a 
limited extent to electricity (to the extent some modes of public transportation already rely on 
electricity).  
 
The limited possibilities for technological substitution may not be unrealistic given that our 
horizon is relatively short-term: we are projecting economic magnitudes for 2020, about ten 
years out from today. Also, the emission taxes and the consequential price changes in our model 
are relatively small.  For example, in the most extreme scenario, when both high and low income 
countries reduce emissions, the overall price of energy rises by 41 percent in China 26 percent in 
India. These prices are not large enough to induce large technology switching responses. For 
example, Birdsall and Subramanian (2009) find that it took the oil price shock of the 1970s—
which involved a quadrupling of energy prices—to induce a small response in energy efficiency 




Even within developing countries, the impact of emission reductions is likely to differ for 
regions where the carbon intensity of production is high, and other regions where it is relatively 
low.  As Figure 3 and Appendix Table 7 show, the high carbon-intensity group clearly includes 
China, India, Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) (all with economy-
wide carbon intensities higher than 500 tons per million dollars), and possibly the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) (at 380 tons per million dollars).
12  The relatively low carbon 
intensity group clearly includes Brazil and the Rest of Latin America (LAC) (with economy wide 
carbon intensities lower than 200 tons per million dollars).  Finally, there is an intermediate 
group, which includes Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Rest of South Asia (SA), and Rest of East 
Asia (EA) (with economy-wide carbon intensities between 280 and 332 tons per million dollars).  
We focus on the first group, especially China and India, because these countries are likely to be 
                                                 
11 The current electricity technologies include five activities—coal, oil and gas, hydro, nuclear and other (essentially 
renewable). The five activities are aggregated together to ‗generate‘ a single electricity commodity distributed to 
households and producers. The ‗aggregator‘ (for example the electricity distribution sector) chooses the least cost 
supplier subject to a CES aggregation function (that is calibrated to base year shares). Thus the coal producer will 
see a decline in demand relative to other producers—particularly hydro, nuclear and other—when subject to the 
carbon tax. The amount of the shift will depend on both the overall demand elasticity as well as the base year share. 
In the current baseline, these shares are fixed at base year levels. It is clear that there are non-price factors that are 
pushing these shares in one direction or another and we are witnessing rapid rises (from a very low base) in 
renewable technologies (notably wind and solar). In the model, and in reality, expansion of hydro is limited to 
physical potential. We make no effort to model changes in the share of nuclear power. In addition, the model ignores 
one potentially significant change in power generation and that is the introduction of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) for coal and gas powered thermal plants. However, CCS is unlikely to become a major technology before 
2020 (though its anticipation could affect investment decisions in the near term). CCS may also be a feasible 
technology in some other fossil-fuel dependent sectors such as cement and iron and steel production. 
12 Production could be relatively carbon intensive in developing countries for these broad GTAP categories both 
because individual products are produced more carbon-intensively and because the broad product categories include 
more carbon-intensive products. 10 
 
subject to the most significant effects, then describe how effects differ for the second group, 
focusing on Brazil, and finally turn to the intermediate group, focusing on SSA. 
 
Figure 3: Economy-wide carbon intensities by countries and regions, tons of carbon per million dollars 
 
 
Category 1: High carbon intensity countries (China, India, Russia, ECA and MENA) 
 
We consider the impact on this group of countries in each of the four scenarios described in 
Section II.  In the first scenario, when cuts are implemented without the possibility of 
international trade in emission rights (the ―NTER‖ scenario), our simulations suggest that the 
average carbon price in high income countries rises to $478 per ton of carbon and to $92 per ton 
of carbon in low and middle income countries (LMICS).
13  Aggregate welfare would fall by 2.2 
percent relative to the baseline in all LMICs, with relatively larger welfare losses in the oil 
exporting regions such as Russia and the Middle East, and somewhat smaller reductions in the 
large emitters such as China and India (Table 3).   
 
Manufacturing exports decline by 4.5 percent in China and 7.3 percent in India. The 
corresponding declines in manufacturing output are 2.9 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively 
                                                 
13 All prices are measured in terms of $2004 per ton of carbon. The price per ton of CO2 can be obtained by dividing 











































14 The main reason for these declines is that manufacturing is the most carbon-
intensive sector, after the energy sector itself, and so is worst hit by carbon price increases. 
 
In the second scenario (TER1), tradability leads to a uniform global carbon price (of $133 per 
ton (Appendix Table 2)) but we abstract from the private transfers that would result from 
tradability.  Recall that this scenario is equivalent a uniform global carbon tax regime where the 
taxes are retained domestically rather than being transferred across countries.  In this case, 
welfare losses increase substantially, especially for China from 1.8 percent to 3.8 percent, and for 
India from 1.5 percent to 2.1 percent (see scenario TER1 in Table 3). Manufacturing output 
declines further to 5.8 and 5.2 percent, respectively in China and India. 
 
Allowing transfers (along with tradability), as expected, alleviates the welfare declines seen in 
the non-tradability scenario (see scenario TER in Table 3).
15  However, it magnifies the impact 
especially on manufacturing exports via Dutch disease-type mechanisms. For example, China‘s 
manufacturing exports fall by 9.4 percent and India‘s by 10.7 percent. The pure effect of the 
private transfers (the difference between the TER1 and TER scenarios) is to induce a further 
decline in exports amounting to 3.6 percent for China and 2.1 percent for India.
 16   
 
The other high carbon intensity countries in regions such as MENA and ECA suffer output and 
export reductions due to the emissions reductions just as in China and India.
17 But the former 
group does not suffer much from emissions tradability and the implied private transfers. The 
magnitude of transfers will depend on the wedge between the domestic carbon price prevailing 
after emission cuts and the uniform global price that will prevail with tradability. For MENA and 
ECA, the former is close to the latter, so that tradability leads to a small price change and hence 
also to a small private transfer.  
 
If developing countries were to receive additional official transfers to compensate for the loss of 
welfare caused by emissions reductions, then the Dutch disease type effects would be even 
stronger (see scenario TERWMT in Table 3). Manufacturing exports would decline by 12 
percent and 15 percent, respectively for China and India. The corresponding figures for 
                                                 
14 Russia is an exception in this group of countries because it‘s manufacturing output and exports increase in the 
NTER scenario (Appendix Tables 5 and 6).  The reason is that when all countries cut their emissions, there is a 
significant contraction in global demand for energy; energy accounts for a large share of the Russian economy (53 
per cent of its exports and 24 per cent of its output, as shown in Appendix Table 8);  the contraction in demand 
induces a significant shift in resources away from Russia‘s energy sector and towards other sectors, including 
manufacturing. 
15 The magnitude of this effect depends of course on the quota allocation scheme. 
16 In our model, Dutch disease effects from transfers arise mainly from the condition that the external accounts must 
be balanced, which is a plausible description of long run equilibrium. Are these effects from transfers plausible? In 
the case of China, for example, the results suggest that a transfer of about 1.8 percent of GDP would depress 
manufacturing export growth by about 0.5 percent. This is well within the range obtained from econometric 
estimates: Rajan and Subramanian (2010) find that a 1 percent increase the aid-to-GDP ratio tends to reduce overall 
manufacturing growth by close to 1 percent. 
17 Russia is different from the other countries in that the global emission reduction leads to an increase in its 
manufacturing output.  The reason is that energy accounts for a large share of its exports and output, and a 
contraction in global demand for energy induces a shift in resources away from this sector towards manufacturing. 12 
 
manufacturing output are 7 percent and 6 percent, respectively. As we mentioned earlier, these 
transfers are unlikely to materialize for the larger developing countries but cannot be ruled out 
for poorer countries.  To maintain welfare, the EU, Japan and US would be required to make 
total transfers (public and private) equal to about 1 per cent of their GDP – a figure similar to the 
recent demands made by developing countries. 
 
In sum, emission limits with tradability create a dilemma for this group of countries:  tradability 
leads to a contraction in the manufacturing sector and the more the country seeks to maintain 
static welfare, the higher the price it will pay in terms of further contraction of this sector.  
Generalizing the results to other scenarios 
Are these results unique to the assumptions we have made about the extent of emissions 
reductions by developing countries? In Figures 4 and 5, we show the consequence of replicating 
the analysis described above for a range of emissions reduction by developing countries—from 
no emissions reduction (relative to BAU) to a 40 percent cut – keeping the emissions reduction 
by high income countries fixed at 30 percent below 2005 levels. For China and India, for 
example, we find results consistent with the findings described earlier.   
 
Figure 4: Impact on China‘s Manufacturing Exports and Output of Emissions Reductions by All Developing 
Countries ( % change, relative to BAU in 2020) 
Note:  Emissions reductions by high income countries are fixed at 30 percent below 2005 levels.  
Several features are noteworthy about these figures. First, as expected, the greater the emissions 
reductions by these countries the greater the decline in their manufacturing exports and output. 
More interesting are the respective consequences of tradability and transfers which are captured 












































































































Figure 5: Impact on India‘s Manufacturing Exports and Output of Emissions Reductions by All Developing 
Countries (% change relative to BAU in 2020) 
 
Note:  Emissions reductions by high income countries are fixed at 30 percent below 2005 levels.  
For exports, significant adverse impacts arise from the Dutch disease type effects of transfers 
(see in Figure 4 and 5 the difference between TER1, which involves no transfers, and TER, 
which allows private transfers, or TERWMT, which allows also public transfers).  For China, the 
incremental effect of private transfers increases with the level of emissions reductions (gap 
between TER and TER1 scenarios widens).
18 Note that a 40 percent emissions reduction relative 
to BAU still represents an increase in emissions relative to 2005. If developing countries had to 
start ensuring even stabilization of carbon emissions by 2020, the implied effects on 
manufacturing exports, based on extrapolating the trends shown in Figures 4 and 5, would be 
enormously large. 
For output, the significant adverse effects arise from the economy-wide carbon price-increasing 
effects of tradability (see in Figures 4 and 5 the difference between NTER, which assumes 
emissions are not tradable, and TER1, which assumes emissions are tradable).  In fact, even if 
India and China made no cuts in emissions but bound emission levels at BAU levels and allowed 
international tradability, each would see a decline in manufacturing output of about 1.5 percent.   
Category 2: Low Carbon Intensity Countries (Brazil and LAC) 
The effects on the manufacturing sector of low carbon intensity countries from policy actions 
related to climate change are likely to be different from those on high carbon intensity countries.  
There are two counteracting factors.  First of all, any change in the price of carbon affects 
manufacturing output and competitiveness less in these countries because of their low carbon 
intensity.   Brazil‘s total carbon intensity, for example, at 168 dollars per ton (Figure 3 and 
Appendix Table 7) is about one-quarter and one-third of China‘s and India‘s, respectively.  
                                                 
18 The magnitude of transfers for any country is the product of the international price of carbon and its own 
sales/purchases of emissions. The international price rises with deeper emissions cuts by developing countries. The 
sales/purchases will depend on the wedge between the domestic and international price of carbon. In the case of 
China, this wedge narrows more gradually—and hence the volume of its emissions sales declines gradually—









































































































Secondly, reductions in emissions require progressively higher carbon price increases in these 
countries, in large part because their production is already relatively clean and it is harder for 
them to squeeze out deeper and deeper reductions.  For example, to achieve a 5 per cent 
reduction, Brazil‘s carbon price would need to be $43; but to achieve a 30 per cent reduction in 
emissions, Brazil‘s carbon price would need to increase to $376 per ton of carbon, more than 
four times the required level in India, and nine times the required level in China (Appendix Table 
3).   
Figure 6: Impact on Brazil‘s Manufacturing Exports and Output of Emissions Reductions by All Developing Countries (% 
change relative to BAU in 2020) 
 
When only small cuts are made in emissions reductions by developing countries, the positive 
effect on Brazil‘s manufacturing sector of its relatively low carbon intensity dominates the 
negative effect due to its higher carbon price (see NTER in Figure 6).  But when larger cuts are 
made, the converse is true – the large increases in carbon price overwhelm the benefits of low 
relative carbon intensity - so that Brazil‘s manufacturing exports and output decline.  If trade in 
emissions rights is allowed, Brazil enters the market at low levels of emissions reductions as a 
seller but at higher levels of emission reductions as a buyer – like the high income countries.  
The result in the latter situations is a decline in the carbon price toward the global uniform price 
and private outflows, both of which benefit the manufacturing sector (see TER1 and TER in 
Figure 6).   
Category 3:  Intermediate Carbon Intensity Countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, Rest of South Asia, 
and Rest of East Asia) 
The impact on SSA, SA and EA is broadly intermediate between those on the high and low 
carbon intensity economies, and we focus here on SSA.
19  The SSA manufacturing sector 
actually expands if all developing countries cut their emissions by 30 per cent (see NTER in 
Figure 7).  The reason is primarily SSA countries‘ low carbon intensity in manufacturing, which 
combined with the lower emissions tax consequent upon emissions reductions, actually improves 
competitiveness relative to other countries.  
                                                 
19 EA resembles Brazil in that emissions reductions require a high carbon price due to their already relatively clean 
production. Therefore, emissions trading leads to a decline in the carbon price which benefits manufacturing. 15 
 
Figure 7: Impact on Sub-Saharan Africa‘s Manufacturing Exports and Output of Emissions Reductions by All Developing 
Countries (% change relative to BAU in 2020) 
 
However, if SSA countries receive large public transfers to compensate for loss in welfare (1.5 
percent), then they could experience an adverse export effect from a Dutch disease-type 
mechanism. The negative effect of transfers (the gap between TER and TERWMT in Figure 7) 
on manufacturing exports could be close to 4 percent - unless these transfers were successfully 
invested in ways that enhanced productivity in manufacturing or reduced trade costs. 
Changes in the composition of manufacturing 
It is clear that the bigger impacts are in energy-intensive manufacturing, but countries may also 
be interested in the impacts on other manufacturing sectors (which includes clothing, electronics 
and transport equipment). The trade-off between carbon and long-run growth effects could be 
different between these sectors. For example, if the dynamic growth effects are less strong in 
energy-intensive sectors than in other manufacturing sectors, and if the latter are not substantially 
affected by emissions reductions and emissions tradability, international commitments on 
emissions reductions should raise fewer growth concerns.  
In countries like China and India, the impact of emissions reductions and tradability on the 
category ―other manufacturing‖ will also be substantial (Appendix Tables 5 and 6). Output will 
decline by 5 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively for the two countries, and exports by close to 7 
percent for both countries. For other countries such as Brazil, East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, 
the impact on the output of other manufacturing sectors will be relatively modest. It is 
noteworthy that Dutch disease effects will remain strong for exports of other manufacturing 
sectors in China, India and sub-Saharan Africa. For China and India, the effect of private 
transfers per se is to induce a decline in exports of 3.7 and 2.4 percent, respectively. For sub-
Saharan Africa, the effect of private and public transfers is to induce a 5.2 percent decline in 
other manufacturing exports.  
Overall, the preceding results suggest that the interests of developing countries might diverge in 
relation to some of the key issues in the climate change negotiations. The differences between 
countries in terms of the impact on the manufacturing sector are the following. High carbon 
intensity countries (China, India, ECA and MENA) will be more resistant to emissions 16 
 
reductions than low carbon intensity countries (Brazil, LAC, East Asia) because of the impact on 
both manufacturing output and exports. Some high carbon intensity countries (especially China 
and India) will also be resistant to emissions tradability because of the further negative impact on 
output and of the impact of the resulting private transfers on manufacturing exports. Low carbon 
intensity countries will not be averse to emissions tradability. For Sub-Saharan African countries, 
a potential negative effect could stem from the effect of public transfers on manufacturing 
exports, unless these transfers could be successfully invested in ways that enhanced productivity 
in manufacturing or reduce traded costs. 
Cost of dislocation 
Thus far, we have focused on the impact of emissions reductions on the composition of output 
and exports. There are also likely to be dislocation costs as resources are re-allocated across 
sectors, and the nature of these dislocations will differ between high and low income countries. 
For example, in the US and EU, all nine manufacturing sectors in our model are likely to expand 
as a result of international tradability of emissions; in contrast, in China, eight of the nine sectors 
are expected to see a decline in output (refined oil, chemicals, rubber and plastics, paper products 
and publishing, mineral products, ferrous metals, other metals, transport equipment, and other 
manufacturing). In India, seven out of the nine sectors are likely to see a decline in output.  If 
some factors are sector-specific and imperfectly mobile (which is assumed away in the model), 
then the transition to any new equilibrium could lead to at least temporary unemployment. The 
irony is that high income countries, which typically have better social protection mechanisms, 
are less likely to need to deal with the contraction of tradable sectors.  
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
With an increasing number of countries accepting the need for action to address climate change, 
both the prospects for and the impact of cooperative emissions reductions are receiving 
significant attention. This paper has attempted, and provided a methodological tool, to quantify 
the impact of cooperative policy actions related to climate change on the manufacturing sector in 
developing countries. It has departed from the existing work on climate change in two ways. 
First, we have disaggregated the policy actions into emission reductions per se, international 
emissions tradability, and international transfers. Second, in terms of outcomes, instead of 
focusing on aggregate output, we quantify the effects on manufacturing output and exports. 
 
These distinctions are important for a number of reasons. The heterogeneity of developing 
countries means that different types of policy action may have different effects and a 
disaggregation is crucial to understanding this heterogeneous response. The focus on the 
manufacturing sector and sub-sectors stems from the need to take into account the possibility that 
manufacturing output and exports could affect long-run growth performance. 
 
Our key findings, which come with all the caveats that we have noted, are the following. Some 
currently high carbon intensity countries/regions (such as China, India, ECA and MENA) will 
experience substantial reductions in manufacturing output and exports from emissions reductions 
per se.  For a sub-set of these countries, especially China and India, these effects will be 17 
 
aggravated by emissions tradability (especially on manufacturing output) and transfers 
(especially on manufacturing exports).  For this sub-set, the negative effects will be substantial 
not just for carbon-intensive manufacturing but also other manufacturing sectors. 
 
In contrast, the manufacturing sector in low carbon intensity countries (such as Brazil and Latin 
America) will be minimally affected by the actions related to climate change. In the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, effects might even be positive, although any boost to manufacturing exports 
could be reduced through transfers and the consequent Dutch disease-type effects. Of course, if 
private and public transfers are able to raise productivity and reduce trade costs, then these 
effects could be offset. 
 
These findings could have implications for the positions that countries adopt in international 
negotiations on climate change.  If there are no growth externalities from shrunken 
manufacturing exports and output, policy choices are simpler because individual countries and 
international cooperative efforts have to deal with only one externality—the carbon externality. 
But if climate change actions, by affecting manufacturing, reduce long-run growth, two 
externalities—carbon and growth—will have to be reconciled. 
 
For low carbon intensity countries, the results suggest that there is little tension between the two 
externalities because the impact of climate change actions on the manufacturing sector is limited. 
For sub-Saharan Africa, there might be a tension related to transfers which would need to be 
addressed. 
 
But for high carbon intensity countries (especially China, India, ECA and MENA), whose 
manufacturing exports and output will be substantially affected, the choice may be more 
difficult. This choice can have several dimensions. For example, countries will have to determine 
where specifically the long run growth externality resides. If it is primarily in non-energy 
intensive manufacturing sectors, developing countries can justifiably resist international 
obligations that adversely affect these sectors. If energy-intensive sectors also have positive 
long-run benefits, the reconciliation between the carbon and growth externalities becomes more 
difficult. 
 
A second dimension relates to policy instruments. If two externalities need to be addressed, two 
policy instruments will need to be deployed.  The first-best solution might then be to tax the 
carbon externality appropriately (by taking on international obligations on emissions reductions 
and tradability) while addressing the manufacturing externality through a combination of 
production subsidies (if the externality lies in manufacturing output) or export subsidies (if the 
externality lies in manufacturing exports). For developing countries, this first best solution will 
encounter two problems. First, WTO rules prohibit the use of export subsidies and production 
subsides can be legally countervailed by trading partners. Unless, these rules are relaxed, the 
first-best response is not possible. A second, arguably bigger, problem is the difficulty of 
implementing subsidies: the experience with industrial policies and ―picking winners‖ has 
highlighted the demanding requirements for successfully doing so. Thus, if implementation 18 
 
capacity is limited and countries find themselves in a second-best world, the reconciliation of the 
two externalities becomes more difficult. 
 
In this second-best world, one option for countries then would be to use one instrument but to 
strike a balance between the two objectives. So, if countries cannot implement subsidies to 
capture the growth externality, they may choose to allow some increase in carbon prices 
(consequent upon say domestic emissions reductions) but not to allow any further increase 
(resulting from emissions tradability). This suggests that selection from the menu of options 
within the climate change regime itself could be a possibility for high carbon intensity 
developing countries.  
 
Of course, any policy choices made by developing countries that depart from the first-best of 
fully taxing the carbon externality would lead to a non-uniform regime for carbon prices and 
hence make developing countries vulnerable to trade action. This vulnerability could be 
minimized if developing countries could persuade their industrial country partners as part of a 
comprehensive agreement on climate change to restrict trade actions to those based on the carbon 
content not in imports but in domestic production (described in a companion paper, Mattoo et al. 
2009).  Actions based on the carbon content of imports and applied across-the-board could have 
serious trade consequences, implying average tariffs on India and China of over 20 percent. 
 
Finally, a much larger issue relates to the sources of long-run economic dynamism. Thus far, we 
have discussed the carbon externality as being at odds with the growth externality for the high 
carbon intensity countries such as China and India. But if their future growth potential lies in 
non-energy intensive sectors and in green technologies, these countries need to be less concerned 
about preserving energy-intensive manufacturing and more eager to create the incentives to 
facilitate the necessary transition. In this case, the carbon and growth externalities would not be 
at odds in the policy choices but mutually reinforcing.  
 
Given the considerable uncertainty about the optimal policy from a growth perspective, a key 
question is whether it is possible to devise a hedging strategy that creates incentives for 
technology generation and adoption in new green sectors without sacrificing the existing 
manufacturing sector. Many developing countries, including China, India, and South Africa, are 
increasingly paying much higher prices for renewable sources of energy than for carbon-based 
sources. The relative price changes induced in this manner may have a less disruptive effect on 
downstream users of energy than an increase in carbon prices, with the government absorbing 
the dislocation costs that would otherwise be imposed on the private sector.  Another option 
could involve non-price-based mechanisms such as funding R&D directly, instituting advance 
market commitments (see Kremer and Glennerster 2004) or through government procurement.  
More research is needed to determine whether these alternatives can achieve the desired goals.  
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Low and Middle 
Income
Both industrial and developing countries 
reduce emissions but emissions rights are not 
tradeable (NTER)
30% relative to 
2005 emission 
levels




Both industrial and developing countries 
reduce emissions; emissions rights are 
tradeable; but we abstract from private 
transfers (TER1)
30% relative to 
2005 emission 
levels




Both industrial and developing countries 
reduce emissions and emissions rights are 
tradeable (TER)
30% relative to 
2005 emission 
levels





Both industrial and developing countries 
reduce emissions; emissions rights are 
tradeable; and transfers offset welfare loss 
from emissions reductions (TERWMT)
30% relative to 
2005 emission 
levels

















Scenario World Total High Income US EU
Low and 
Middle 
Income China Brazil  India SSA
NTER -33.8 -40.9 -43.9 -40.9 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0
TER1 -33.8 -18.8 -21.4 -14.8 -41.9 -50.5 -14.9 -38.0 -42.3
TER -33.8 -42.3 -21.5 -15.0 -41.8 -50.4 -15.0 -38.0 -42.3
TERWMT -33.8 -42.0 -21.8 -15.5 -41.6 -50.4 -15.0 -37.9 -42.0
NTER 14.5 -26.5 -30.0 -30.0 54.3 97.3 -5.0 78.0 24.0
TER1 14.5 0.4 -1.9 1.1 28.0 39.6 15.6 57.6 2.2
TER 14.5 0.2 -2.1 0.8 28.2 39.9 15.4 57.7 2.3
TERWMT 14.5 -0.2 -2.4 0.1 28.6 39.8 15.4 58.0 2.8
% Change in Emissions Relative to Business as Usual (BAU) in 2020
% Change in Emissions Relative to 2005
Table 2: Impact on Emissions Reductions 
Notes: NTER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but emissions rights are not tradeable;  TER1: Both industrial and developing countries 
reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; but we abstract from private transfers;  TER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions 




   
Scenario World Total High Income US  EU
Low and 
Middle 
Income      China      India      Brazil SSA
NTER -1.5 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 -2.2 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 -1.9
TER1 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -2.6 -3.8 -2.1 -0.5 -2.0
TER -0.9 -0.5 -0.7 -0.4 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 -0.8 -1.5
TERWMT -0.8 -1.2 -1.1 -1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NTER -1.7 n.a. -1.3 -0.7 -2.5 -2.9 -3.7 -0.8 1.8
TER1 -1.6 n.a. 0.0 0.5 -4.0 -5.8 -5.2 0.6 -5.2
TER -1.5 n.a. 0.8 0.7 -4.4 -6.5 -5.5 0.6 0.7
TERWMT -1.4 n.a. 1.6 1.3 -5.0 -7.0 -6.1 -0.2 0.3
NTER -2.9 -2.4 -2.3 -1.9 -3.5 -4.5 -7.3 -1.5 5.8
TER1 -1.8 0.2 0.1 1.2 -3.9 -5.8 -8.6 2.0 3.5
TER -1.9 1.6 2.7 2.6 -5.6 -9.4 -10.7 2.7 2.3
TERWMT -1.9 3.9 5.0 6.5 -8.3 -11.7 -15.4 -0.7 -1.0
% Change in Welfare
% Change in Output of Total Manufacturing
% Change in Exports of Total Manufacturing
Table 3: Impact on Welfare, Manufacturing Output, and Exports
Notes: Changes are expressed relative to business-as-usual in 2020;  NTER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but 
emissions rights are not tradeable; TER1: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; but we 
abstract from private transfers; TER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions rights are tradeable;  TERWMT: 
Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; and transfers offset welfare loss from emissions 26 
 
 
Technical Appendix: The Model 
 
The results in this paper rely on the World Bank‘s Environmental Impact and Sustainability Applied General 
Equilibrium (ENVISAGE) Model.
20 The ENVISAGE model‘s core is a relatively standard recursive dynamic 
global general equilibrium (CGE) model. Incorporated with the core CGE model is a greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions module that is connected to a simple climate module that converts emissions into atmospheric 
concentrations, radiative forcing and changes in mean global temperature. The climate module has feedback on 
the economic model through so-called damage functions—currently limited to productivity shocks in 
agriculture. The combination of the socio-economic CGE model with the climate module is commonly referred 
to an integrated assessment model (IAM). 
 
ENVISAGE is calibrated to Release 7 of the GTAP dataset with a 2004 base year.
21 It has been used to simulate 
dynamic scenarios through 2100. For the purposes of this study, 2020 is the terminal year. The 113 
countries/regions of GTAP are aggregated to 15 countries/regions for this study and the 57 sectors are 
aggregated to 21 sectors. Full detail on the aggregation is provided in Appendix Table 1. The GTAP data is 
supplemented with satellite accounts that include emissions of the so-called Kyoto gases—carbon dioxide 
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and hydrofluorocarbons (F-gases), different electricity production 
activities (coal, oil and gas, hydro, nuclear and other), and potential land and hydro supplies. 
 
Within each time period a full equilibrium is achieved given the fixed regional endowments, technology and 
consumer preferences. Production is modeled as a series of nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
functions that are designed to reflect the substitution and complementarity of inputs. Unlike many standard 
models, energy plays a key role as an input and is modeled as a complement to capital in the short-run but a 
substitute to capital in the long run. This reflects the putty/clay specification of production that incorporates 
vintage capital. The key assumption is that there is greater substitution across inputs in the long run (i.e. with 
new capital) than in the short run (with old or installed) capital. One consequence of this specification is that 
countries that have higher growth and higher rates of investment typically have a more flexible economy in the 
aggregate. Thus, all else equal, the same tax on carbon has a lower cost. There is a single representative 
household that consumes goods and services and saves.
22 The savings rate is partially a function of the 
demographic structure of the region. Savings rise as either the elderly or youth dependency ratios fall. The 
government sector is relatively passive. Aggregate expenditures are fixed as a share of total GDP and revenues 
adjust to maintain fiscal balance (through a lump sum tax on households). Investment is savings driven. 
 
Aggregate demand by sector is summed across all domestic agents and represents a composite of domestically 
produced goods and imports—the so-called Armington aggregate.
23 The aggregate Armington good is allocated 
between domestic production and imports using a two-nested CES specification. The first nest allocates 
aggregate demand between domestic production and an aggregate import bundle. The second nest decomposes 
aggregate imports into import by region of origin. This generates a bilateral trade flow matrix. Domestic 
producers are assumed to supply both domestic and export markets without friction, i.e. the law of one price 
holds for domestically produced goods irrespective of their final destination.
24 Bilateral trade is associated with 
three price wedges. The first wedge reflects differences between producer prices and the border (FOB) price, 
                                                 
20 See van der Mensbrugghe 2008 for full details of the model. 
21 See www.gtap.org. 
22 The model is designed with several different consumer demand specifications including the CDE (see Hertel 1997), the LES/ELES 
(see van der Mensbrugghe 2006) and the AIDADS (see Rimmer and Powell 1992 and van der Mensbrugghe 2006). For this paper we 
have used the AIDADS. 
23 Armington 1969. 
24 Analogously to aggregate domestic demand, the model allows for a two-nested constant-elasticity-of-transformation function to 
allocate domestic production between domestic and foreign markets. 27 
 
i.e. an export tax or subsidy. The second wedge reflects international trade and transport margins, i.e. the 
difference between FOB and CIF prices. The third wedge reflects the difference between the CIF price and the 
end-user price, i.e. import tariffs. All three wedges are fully bilateral. 
 
Model closure is consistent with long-term equilibrium. As stated above, fiscal balance is maintained through 
lump sum taxes on households under the assumption of fixed public expenditures (relative to GDP). Changes in 
revenues, for example carbon tax revenues, imply a net decrease in household direct taxes. Investment is 
savings driven. This assumption implies that changes in investment are likely to be relatively minor since public 
and foreign savings are fixed and household savings will be relatively stable relative to income. The third 
closure rule is that the capital account is balanced. Ex ante changes in the trade balance are therefore offset 
through real exchange rate effects. A positive rise in net transfers, for example through a cap and trade scheme, 
would tend to lead to a real exchange rate appreciation. 
 
The model dynamics are relatively straightforward. Population and labor force growth rates are based on the 
UN population‘s projection
25—with the growth in the labor force equated to the growth of the working age 
population. Investment, as mentioned above, is savings driven and the latter is partially influenced by 
demographics. Productivity growth in the baseline is ‗calibrated‘ to achieve a target growth path for per capita 
incomes—differentiated for agriculture, manufacturing and services. 
 
Emissions of GHGs have three drivers. Most are generated through consumption of goods—either in 
intermediate of final demand—for example the combustion of fossil fuels. Some are driven by the level of 
factor input—for example methane produced by rice is linked to the amount of cultivated land. And the 
remainder is generated by aggregate output—for example waste-based methane emissions. The climate module 




The temperature change is linked back to the socio-economic model through damage functions. The damage 
functions—currently limited to agriculture—are calibrated to estimates provided by Cline (2007). His estimates 
relate to anticipated productivity impacts from a 2.5° C in temperature
27, estimated to occur according to his 
estimates in 2080. Cline provides two sets of estimates. One set allows for the positive impact of higher 
concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere on plant growth—a so-called carbon fertilization effect. The other 
excludes this effect. The scientific community is still uncertain about this effect. Greenhouse gas experiments 
suggest it may be potent. Field experiments suggest otherwise. In our simulations, we use the average of the two 
estimates. 
 
ENVISAGE has a flexible system of mitigation policies (limited to the moment to CO2 emissions alone). The 
simplest is a country or region specific carbon tax—that also allows for exemptions for designated sectors or 
households. An alternative is to provide a cap on emissions at either a country, regional or global level. The 
model will then produce the shadow price of carbon, i.e. the carbon tax, as a model outcome. If a global cap is 
imposed, a single uniform tax will be calculated. This type of regime assumes no trading. A final option is to 
have a regional or global cap with trading and assigned quotas. Similar to the previous regime, a uniform carbon 
tax will be calculated (and would be nearly identical to the no-trade carbon tax), but emissions trading would 
occur depending on the initial quotas and the shape of the individual marginal abatement curves for each 
member of the trading regime. 
 
                                                 
25 United Nations 2007. 
26 The climate module is largely derived from the MERGE model, Manne et al 1995. 
27 Which he assumes occurs in the 2080s based on the SRES scenarios (IPCC 2000) and global climate change model (GCM) runs. 28 
 
One intuitive way to capture the inter-country differences of a carbon tax is the following formula that is 
derived from a simple partial equilibrium framework:
28 
 
(1)   
 
In formula (1),   is the carbon tax, P is the price of energy (for example $ per ton of oil equivalent),   is the 
average carbon content of energy (for example ton of carbon per ton of oil equivalent),   is the overall elasticity 
of substitution across factors include energy and R is the level of emissions reduction.
29 The left hand side of the 
formula shows the level of reduction for a given carbon tax and the right hand side shows the level of the 
carbon tax for a given reduction level. With R equal to 0, the carbon tax is obviously 0. The formula suggests 
that the carbon tax is higher (for a given targeted reduction) with higher energy prices, lower carbon content 
(i.e. cleaner economies) and less flexible economies (i.e. with a low value for  ). This suggests that the carbon 
tax will be higher on average in developed economies that already have high energy prices and relatively clean 
energy (for example France and Japan) and have lower savings and therefore more installed and less flexible 
capital than on average in the rapidly developing economies. The implication of this is that on aggregate 
developed countries will wish to purchase carbon offsets from developing countries in a cap and trade regime 





























                                                 
28 See Burniaux et al. 1992. 
29 For example, if energy is priced at $50 per ton of oil equivalent and the average carbon content is 50% and the substitution elasticity 




Table 1a: Regional dimensions of ENVISAGE
a 
1  eur  EU27 with EFTA 
   
Austria (aut), Belgium (bel), Cyprus (cyp), Czech Republic (cze), Denmark (dnk), Estonia (est), Finland (fin), 
France (fra), Germany (deu), Greece (grc), Hungary (hun), Ireland (irl), Italy (ita), Latvia (lva), Lithuania (ltu), 
Luxembourg (lux), Malta (mlt), Netherlands (nld), Poland (pol), Portugal (prt), Slovakia (svk), Slovenia (svn), 
Spain (esp), Sweden (swe), United Kingdom (gbr), Switzerland (che), Norway (nor), Rest of EFTA (xef), 
Bulgaria (bgr), Romania (rou) 
2  usa  United States 
3  jpn  Japan 
4  kor  Korea 
5  rha  Rest of high income Annex 1 
   
Australia (aus), New Zealand (nzl), Canada (can) 
6  rhy  Rest of high income 
   
Hong Kong (hkg), Taiwan (twn), Singapore (sgp) 
6  bra  Brazil 
7  chn  China 
8  ind  India 
9  rus  Russia 
10  xea  Rest of East Asia 
   
Rest of Oceania (xoc), Rest of East Asia (xea), Cambodia (khm), Laos (lao), Myanmar (mmr), Viet Nam (vnm), 
Indonesia (idn), Malaysia (mys), Philippines (phl), Thailand (tha),  Bangladesh (bgd), Pakistan (pak) 
11  xsa  Rest of South Asia 
   
Rest of Southeast Asia (xse), Sri Lanka (lka), Rest of South Asia (xsa) 
12  xec  Rest of Europe and Central Asia 
   
Albania (alb), Belarus (blr), Croatia (hrv), Ukraine (ukr), Rest of Eastern Europe (xee), Rest of Europe (xer), 
Kazakhstan (kaz), Kyrgystan (kgz), Rest of Former Soviet Union (xsu), Armenia (arm), Azerbaijan (aze), 
Georgia (geo) 
13  mna  Middle East and North Africa 
   
Iran (irn), Turkey (tur), Rest of Western Asia (xws), Egypt (egy), Morocco (mar), Tunisia (tun), Rest of North 
Africa (xnf) 
14  ssa  Sub-Saharan Africa 
   
Nigeria (nga), Senegal (sen), Rest of Western Africa (xwf), Central Africa (xcf), South-Central Africa (xac), 
Ethiopia (eth), Madagascar (mdg), Malawi (mwi), Mauritius (mus), Mozambique (moz), Tanzania (tza), Uganda 
(uga), Zambia (zmb), Zimbabwe (zwe), Rest of Eastern Africa (xec), Botswana (bwa), South Africa (zaf), Rest 
of South African Customs Union (xsc) 
15  xlc  Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean 
   
Mexico (mex), Rest of North America (xna), Argentina (arg), Bolivia (bol), Chile (chl), Colombia (col), Ecuador 
(ecu), Paraguay (pry), Peru (per), Uruguay (ury), Venezuela (ven), Rest of South America (xsm), Costa Rica 
(cri), Guatemala (gtm), Nicaragua (nic), Panama (pan), Rest of Central America (xca), Caribbean (xcb) 
Note(s):  a) Aggregate regions indicate relevant GTAP countries/regions with GTAP code in parenthesis. 
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Appendix Table 1b: Sectoral dimensions of ENVISAGE
a 
1  cop  Crops 
   
Paddy rice (pdr), Wheat (wht), Cereal grains, n.e.s. (gro), Vegetables and fruits (v_f), Oil seeds (osd), Sugar cane 
and sugar beet (c_b), Plant-based fibers (pfb), Crops, n.e.s. (ocr) 
2  lvs  Livestock 
   
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses (ctl), Animal products n.e.s. (oap), Raw milk (rmk), Wool, silk-worm 
cocoons (wol) 
3  frs  Forestry 
4  coa  Coal 
5  oil  Crude oil 
6  gas  Natural gas 
7  omn  Other mining 
8  pfd  Processed food 
   
Fishing (fsh), Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat products (cmt), Meat products n.e.s. (omt), Vegetable oils 
and fats (vol), Dairy products (mil), Processed rice (pcr), Sugar (sgr), Food products n.e.s. (ofd), Beverages and 
tobacco products (b_t) 
9  p_c  Refined oil 
10  crp  Chemicals rubber and plastics 
11  ppp  Paper products, publishing 
12  nmm  Mineral products n.e.s. 
13  i_s  Ferrous metals 
14  nfm  Metals n.e.s. 
15  tre  Transport equipment 
    Motor vehicles and parts (mvh), Transport equipment n.e.s. (otn) 
16  mnu  Other manufacturing 
   
Textiles (tex), Wearing apparel (wap), Leather products (lea), Wood products (lum), Metal products (fmp), 
Electronic equipment (ele), Machinery and equipment n.e.s. (ome), Manufactures n.e.s. (omf) 
17  ely  Electricity
b 
18  gdt  Gas distribution 
19  cns  Construction 
20  trp  Transport services 
    Transport n.e.s. (otp), Sea transport (wtp), Air transport (atp) 
21  osv  Other services 
   
Water (wtr), Trade (trd), Communication (cmn), Financial services n.e.s. (ofi), Insurance (isr), Business services 
n.e.s. (obs), Recreation and other services (ros), Public administration and defence, education, health services 
(osg), Dwellings (dwe) 
Note(s):  a) Aggregate sectors indicate relevant GTAP sectors with GTAP code in parenthesis. 
 
b) Electricity is a single consumed and traded commodity. However, in each region/country it is 
produced by multiple activities that include coal and gas power plants, hydro-electricity, nuclear and 
other (mainly renewable) technologies. 
 






















































NTER -40.9 -43.9 -29.0 -44.7 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -40.9 -30.0 -33.8
TER1 -14.8 -21.4 -8.9 -24.5 -21.6 -14.9 -50.5 -38.0 -47.9 -24.5 -32.0 -36.6 -29.7 -42.3 -24.1 -18.8 -41.9 -33.8
TER -15.0 -21.5 -8.9 -24.6 -21.8 -15.0 -50.4 -38.0 -47.2 -24.7 -32.1 -36.5 -29.9 -42.3 -24.2 -19.0 -41.8 -33.8
TERWMT -15.5 -21.8 -9.3 -24.7 -21.9 -15.0 -50.4 -37.9 -46.7 -24.3 -31.8 -36.3 -29.6 -42.0 -23.6 -19.4 -41.6 -33.8
NTER -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 -30.0 19.9 -5.0 97.3 78.0 56.8 20.1 53.4 55.4 -6.9 24.0 19.4 -26.9 54.3 14.5
TER1 1.1 -1.9 -10.1 -4.4 34.2 15.6 39.6 57.6 16.8 29.6 48.9 40.8 -6.6 2.2 29.5 0.4 28.0 14.5
TER 0.8 -2.1 -10.2 -4.6 34.0 15.4 39.9 57.7 18.2 29.2 48.7 41.1 -6.8 2.3 29.3 0.2 28.2 14.5
TERWMT 0.1 -2.4 -10.5 -4.8 33.8 15.4 39.8 58.0 19.5 29.9 49.5 41.5 -6.3 2.8 30.2 -0.2 28.6 14.5
Relative to 2005
Appendix Table 2. Emissions Reductions (percent)
Relative to Business as Usual (BAU) in 2020
Notes: NTER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but emissions rights are not tradeable;  TER1: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; but we abstract 
from private transfers; TER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions rights are tradeable;  TERWMT: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; 








































NTER 634.8 418.2 638.1 388.9 217.1 375.9 54.4 92.4 55.4 190.5 122.7 100.1 139.4 75.9 192.3 477.6 91.9 212.4
TER1 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7 131.7
TER 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7 132.7
TERWMT 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3 134.3
Appendix Table 3. Emissions Tax in dollars per ton carbon 
Notes: Changes are expressed relative to business-as-usual in 2020;  NTER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but emissions rights are not tradeable;  TER1: Both industrial and developing countries 
reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; but we abstract from private transfers;  TER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions rights are tradeable;  TERWMT: Both industrial and 





NTER TER1 TER TERWMT
EU27 with EFTA -1.3 -0.1 -0.4 -1.4
United States -1.3 -0.2 -0.7 -1.1
Japan -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.9
Rest of high income Annex 1 -1.9 -0.7 -1.1 -1.7
Rest of high income -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 0.0
Brazil -1.4 -0.5 -0.8 0.0
China -1.8 -3.8 -1.5 0.0
India -1.5 -2.1 -1.5 0.0
Russia -3.6 -4.3 -2.1 0.0
Rest of East Asia -2.6 -1.7 -2.0 0.0
Rest of South Asia -2.2 -2.0 -1.9 0.0
Rest of ECA -2.0 -2.5 -1.5 0.0
Middle East and North Africa -2.5 -2.1 -2.1 0.0
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.9 -2.0 -1.5 0.0
Rest of LAC -3.2 -2.0 -2.2 0.0
High income countries -1.2 -0.2 -0.5 -1.2
Low and middle income countries -2.2 -2.6 -1.7 0.0
World total -1.5 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8
Appendix Table 4. Change in Welfare by regions (percent)
Scenarios         
Countries/Regions
Cooperative Reductions
Notes: Changes are expressed relative to business-as-usual in 2020;  NTER: Both 
industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but emissions rights are not 
tradeable; TER1: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; 
emissions rights are tradeable; but we abstract from private transfers;  TER: Both 
industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions rights are 
tradeable; TERWMT: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; 














































Agriculture -2.2 -4.2 -1.1 -1.3 -0.5 -2.9 0.9 -0.2 1.5 1.0 0.8 -0.5 0.9 0.5 0.6 -2.7 0.4 -0.9
All energy -8.9 -17.7 -3.1 -13.7 -2.2 -10.0 -9.3 -10.8 -7.9 -13.1 -15.5 -7.2 -11.1 -7.0 -20.4 -11.6 -11.2 -11.4
All manufacturing -0.7 -1.3 -1.6 0.5 -2.1 -0.8 -2.9 -3.7 1.5 -1.4 -4.0 -4.0 -5.9 1.8 0.2 -1.1 -2.5 -1.7
Energy intensive manufacturing -0.2 -4.4 -2.2 -4.1 -0.2 -3.0 -1.8 -4.5 5.4 -3.9 -20.0 -7.1 -12.9 6.2 -0.4 -1.8 -2.7 -2.2
Other manufacturing -1.0 0.1 -1.2 3.5 -2.9 0.2 -3.6 -3.3 -0.8 -0.6 0.0 -2.2 -3.5 -0.3 0.4 -0.7 -2.4 -1.4
Other industries -0.6 -1.8 -0.6 -3.7 0.1 -1.0 -1.9 -1.7 -1.7 -2.0 -2.3 -2.5 -1.5 -1.7 -2.1 -1.1 -1.8 -1.4
Service -0.9 -0.6 -0.1 -1.1 0.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.3 -1.0 -1.3 0.3 -1.2 0.2 -0.3 -1.8 -0.7 -1.0 -0.7
Total -1.1 -1.6 -0.6 -1.8 -1.0 -1.9 -2.7 -3.0 -1.9 -2.5 -2.6 -3.3 -2.8 -0.4 -3.2 -1.3 -2.6 -1.7
Agriculture -1.8 -4.1 -1.0 -4.1 -0.8 -3.3 1.3 -0.3 2.3 0.4 0.9 -0.4 0.6 0.9 0.0 -2.7 0.4 -1.0
All energy -3.5 -10.2 -0.6 -7.8 -2.6 -4.9 -15.6 -14.6 -13.2 -10.4 -16.1 -10.0 -12.0 -7.8 -15.3 -6.1 -13.2 -10.0
All manufacturing 0.5 0.0 -0.2 1.5 -0.6 0.6 -5.8 -5.2 -4.7 -0.4 -3.5 -4.6 -4.5 0.9 0.2 0.2 -4.0 -1.6
Energy intensive manufacturing 2.8 -0.1 2.3 1.1 2.3 0.8 -9.3 -9.4 -9.4 -2.1 -22.5 -13.8 -13.4 1.5 -1.2 1.8 -7.8 -2.1
Other manufacturing -0.7 0.0 -1.4 1.7 -2.0 0.4 -4.1 -3.1 -2.0 0.1 1.1 0.6 -1.5 0.6 0.8 -0.6 -2.2 -1.3
Other industries -0.1 -0.8 0.0 -1.4 0.4 -0.4 -4.4 -2.8 -1.8 -1.7 -2.2 -3.5 -1.3 -2.3 -1.4 -0.3 -3.0 -1.5
Service -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -3.1 -1.8 -0.9 -1.1 0.1 -1.9 0.0 -0.6 -1.4 -0.2 -1.6 -0.5
Total -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.7 -5.3 -4.2 -4.5 -1.7 -2.6 -4.4 -2.5 -1.0 -2.4 -0.4 -3.7 -1.5
Agriculture -1.6 -2.8 -1.0 -2.7 -0.8 -2.5 1.3 -0.3 2.3 0.4 0.9 -0.1 0.6 0.9 0.1 -2.0 0.5 -0.6
All energy -3.5 -10.1 -0.5 -7.5 -2.5 -4.8 -15.2 -14.5 -13.2 -10.4 -16.1 -9.9 -12.0 -7.7 -15.1 -6.0 -13.0 -9.9
All manufacturing 0.7 0.8 0.1 1.9 -0.4 0.6 -6.5 -5.5 -5.7 -0.3 -3.6 -5.0 -4.6 0.7 0.1 0.6 -4.4 -1.5
Energy intensive manufacturing 3.0 0.7 2.6 1.6 2.5 0.9 -9.7 -9.7 -11.1 -2.1 -22.6 -14.5 -13.6 1.2 -1.3 2.2 -8.1 -2.1
Other manufacturing -0.4 0.9 -1.1 2.1 -1.7 0.4 -4.9 -3.3 -2.6 0.2 1.0 0.4 -1.5 0.5 0.8 -0.2 -2.7 -1.2
Other industries -0.4 -1.1 -0.2 -1.5 0.2 -0.6 -2.2 -2.2 -0.1 -1.8 -2.1 -2.8 -1.4 -1.8 -1.5 -0.6 -1.9 -1.1
Service -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -2.1 -1.6 0.1 -1.3 0.1 -1.6 -0.1 -0.5 -1.4 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5
Total -0.1 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -5.1 -4.2 -4.1 -1.7 -2.6 -4.3 -2.5 -0.9 -2.4 -0.3 -3.6 -1.4
Agriculture -0.9 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -2.6 1.3 0.0 2.4 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.8 -0.4 -1.0 0.5 -0.1
All energy -3.4 -10.0 -0.5 -7.0 -2.6 -5.0 -14.9 -14.2 -13.1 -9.8 -15.9 -9.6 -11.5 -7.3 -15.5 -5.9 -12.8 -9.7
All manufacturing 1.3 1.6 1.4 2.5 -0.6 -0.2 -7.0 -6.1 -6.9 -1.0 -5.2 -5.8 -4.9 0.3 -0.7 1.2 -5.0 -1.4
Energy intensive manufacturing 3.6 1.3 3.8 2.3 2.2 -0.1 -10.0 -10.6 -13.2 -2.9 -23.1 -15.5 -14.0 0.5 -1.8 2.8 -8.7 -1.9
Other manufacturing 0.1 1.7 0.2 2.7 -1.9 -0.2 -5.5 -3.9 -3.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -1.8 0.2 -0.1 0.5 -3.3 -1.1
Other industries -1.1 -1.4 -0.9 -1.7 0.7 0.3 -0.8 -1.0 1.5 0.1 -0.3 -1.8 0.8 -0.6 0.4 -1.0 -0.4 -0.7
Service -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 -1.5 -1.1 1.1 -0.5 0.7 -1.1 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5
Total -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.6 -0.4 -0.8 -5.0 -4.1 -3.8 -1.5 -2.7 -4.2 -2.2 -0.6 -2.4 -0.2 -3.5 -1.3
Appendix Table 5. Change in Output by sector (percent)
Notes: Changes are expressed relative to business-as-usual in 2020; NTER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but emissions rights are not tradeable;  TER1: Both industrial and developing 
countries reduce emissions; emissions rights are tradeable; but we abstract from private transfers;  TER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions rights are tradeable;  TERWMT: 













































Agriculture -14.4 -8.2 -13.2 -3.1 -9.4 -7.5 4.8 5.4 13.2 -0.7 -0.9 -4.1 0.8 1.2 0.2 -8.0 -3.2 -6.8
All energy -14.0 -36.6 -5.4 -18.7 14.7 -4.7 -13.1 7.3 -11.7 -7.9 -6.8 -8.3 -21.3 -7.8 -23.4 -20.2 -13.7 -15.2
All manufacturing -1.9 -2.3 -3.9 0.5 -3.3 -1.5 -4.5 -7.3 8.1 -1.7 -5.6 -5.7 -8.4 5.8 6.3 -2.4 -3.5 -2.9
Energy intensive manufacturing 1.7 -10.7 -6.2 -8.5 -0.3 -9.5 1.8 -6.8 14.3 -4.5 -43.4 -7.9 -19.1 15.3 8.4 -4.2 -2.7 -3.5
Other manufacturing -3.7 1.1 -3.3 6.7 -4.1 2.2 -5.6 -7.5 -0.4 -1.0 -0.1 -4.0 -5.4 -1.3 5.5 -1.7 -3.7 -2.7
Other industries -5.0 -1.7 -3.1 -15.8 -6.5 -8.5 -2.2 -3.1 3.1 1.3 2.0 -7.2 1.3 -1.1 6.8 -7.5 0.1 -3.0
Service -5.4 -4.2 -0.6 0.3 0.7 -11.0 7.3 6.8 17.1 -1.9 13.1 8.3 5.7 4.8 -0.3 -3.5 5.2 -0.1
Total -3.7 -4.5 -3.6 -3.3 -2.5 -4.4 -3.8 -4.0 -3.2 -2.4 -2.1 -4.5 -4.1 -0.7 -5.1 -3.6 -3.7 -3.6
Agriculture -13.2 -8.4 -15.2 -7.2 -10.5 -8.6 23.8 9.5 19.0 -3.2 -1.7 -4.8 0.5 3.2 -1.7 -8.9 -4.0 -7.7
All energy -2.3 -19.3 4.1 -10.8 5.6 -8.3 -15.4 -0.3 -1.3 -6.1 -2.6 -7.2 -12.7 -5.2 -15.2 -9.4 -8.3 -8.5
All manufacturing 1.2 0.1 -0.8 2.5 -1.3 2.0 -5.8 -8.6 -9.6 -0.2 -3.4 -6.3 -5.8 3.5 5.2 0.2 -3.9 -1.8
Energy intensive manufacturing 10.9 0.4 10.6 1.5 4.4 3.3 -21.8 -20.3 -15.0 -2.0 -48.5 -17.0 -20.1 4.0 3.9 5.6 -13.4 -2.4
Other manufacturing -3.4 0.0 -4.0 3.3 -2.9 1.5 -2.9 -4.3 -2.1 0.3 3.2 1.6 -1.7 3.2 5.7 -2.0 -1.2 -1.6
Other industries -5.1 -3.0 -3.6 -7.2 -6.3 -3.0 -3.1 -8.4 2.3 -4.6 1.0 -9.5 0.3 -5.5 3.4 -5.3 -2.6 -3.7
Service -3.9 -2.9 -2.7 0.0 -1.0 -5.4 8.1 11.6 5.7 -3.3 8.6 4.8 3.6 1.5 -3.7 -2.8 3.8 -0.3
Total -0.8 -2.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -2.7 -5.0 -4.5 -3.4 -1.3 -0.9 -5.2 -2.9 -1.1 -3.1 -1.3 -3.5 -2.4
Agriculture -10.4 -5.7 -13.0 -4.8 -8.6 -6.5 14.5 5.1 6.4 -1.0 -0.1 -5.3 2.1 2.1 0.3 -6.2 -2.5 -5.4
All energy -2.4 -17.8 4.8 -10.1 6.5 -6.8 -17.6 -0.5 -4.0 -5.8 -2.2 -7.5 -12.4 -5.1 -14.6 -8.7 -8.7 -8.7
All manufacturing 2.6 2.7 0.0 3.6 -0.9 2.7 -9.4 -10.7 -14.7 0.1 -3.8 -7.2 -5.9 2.3 5.5 1.6 -5.6 -1.9
Energy intensive manufacturing 12.0 2.6 11.5 2.7 4.8 3.7 -24.7 -21.6 -19.4 -2.0 -48.9 -18.0 -20.3 3.1 4.2 6.9 -14.7 -2.2
Other manufacturing -1.9 2.7 -3.2 4.3 -2.5 2.3 -6.6 -6.7 -8.3 0.6 2.7 0.8 -1.8 1.8 6.0 -0.5 -3.0 -1.8
Other industries -3.9 -0.7 -2.6 -5.7 -5.3 -1.6 -5.5 -8.6 -0.8 -2.6 1.3 -10.2 0.7 -5.5 4.3 -3.8 -2.5 -3.0
Service -3.4 -1.3 -2.6 0.7 -1.1 -5.1 4.6 9.3 1.1 -3.7 7.9 3.1 3.6 0.2 -3.5 -2.1 2.7 -0.3
Total 0.3 0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.5 -8.6 -6.5 -7.0 -1.0 -1.3 -6.0 -3.0 -1.6 -2.7 0.0 -4.9 -2.3
Agriculture -4.1 -2.7 -6.9 -1.5 -7.3 -6.7 11.5 -2.8 -2.9 -2.6 -1.4 -5.6 -0.4 -1.5 -4.0 -2.7 -4.4 -3.1
All energy -0.7 -16.4 6.0 -8.7 7.0 -7.6 -17.8 -0.9 -6.0 -5.3 -3.3 -7.3 -12.7 -4.6 -15.9 -7.3 -9.4 -8.9
All manufacturing 6.5 5.0 4.4 5.1 -1.2 -0.7 -11.7 -15.4 -20.0 -1.7 -8.8 -8.8 -7.7 -1.0 0.3 3.9 -8.3 -1.9
Energy intensive manufacturing 15.6 4.8 15.8 4.1 4.4 0.3 -26.6 -24.6 -24.1 -3.8 -51.0 -19.5 -21.7 0.4 -0.6 9.2 -17.1 -1.9
Other manufacturing 2.2 5.2 1.2 5.7 -2.8 -1.1 -9.0 -12.0 -14.4 -1.2 -2.7 -1.0 -3.8 -2.0 0.6 1.9 -5.7 -1.9
Other industries -1.1 1.8 0.2 -3.5 -4.6 -3.2 -6.4 -10.0 -4.2 -2.2 -0.4 -11.0 0.0 -6.6 1.4 -1.3 -3.7 -2.7
Service -1.0 0.0 -0.2 1.8 -1.8 -8.4 2.3 4.6 -3.6 -5.7 3.2 1.1 1.3 -2.8 -8.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.4
Total 3.8 2.6 3.9 1.7 -1.2 -3.6 -10.8 -10.8 -10.2 -2.5 -5.6 -7.3 -4.9 -3.2 -6.4 2.2 -7.2 -2.3
Notes: Changes are expressed relative to business-as-usual in 2020; NTER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions but emissions rights are not tradeable;  TER1: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; emissions 
rights are tradeable; but we abstract from private transfers; TER: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions and emissions rights are tradeable;  TERWMT: Both industrial and developing countries reduce emissions; emissions rights are 

























































Agriculture 40 57 41 45 39 63 82 0 65 24 9 94 44 15 46 45 47 46
All energy 485 879 396 611 609 116 2067 1501 984 665 678 785 456 727 458 642 886 758
All manufacturing 18 36 21 38 36 53 127 111 158 91 127 243 152 65 47
Energy intensive manufacturing 43 90 53 92 98 141 326 283 313 288 735 538 384 159 126 62 279 116
Other manufacturing 7 12 6 8 8 8 35 36 31 34 20 74 50 17 13
Other industries 6 3 6 34 5 18 29 13 30 38 4 62 36 38 25 7 30 13
Service 21 32 16 38 39 63 82 68 171 135 89 213 107 67 73 26 97 36
Total 30 59 26 65 56 58 202 184 311 132 127 308 183 115 80 42 165 69
Agriculture 74 141 76 126 112 129 350 301 307 75 104 335 184 72 113 n.a n.a n.a
All energy 541 1016 433 735 636 186 2800 1749 1333 752 753 982 582 823 609 n.a n.a n.a
All manufacturing 62 159 79 156 133 168 681 518 848 244 282 712 378 273 144 n.a n.a n.a
Energy intensive manufacturing 107 272 140 293 251 286 1163 888 1193 541 1062 1190 746 505 264 n.a n.a n.a
Other manufacturing 42 111 51 81 80 107 459 354 568 158 145 437 215 156 92 n.a n.a n.a
Other industries 46 69 46 114 77 89 561 287 381 232 218 401 179 240 110 n.a n.a n.a
Service 46 94 40 89 100 101 340 231 409 265 160 435 232 161 133 n.a n.a n.a
Total 74 153 70 157 155 149 772 535 767 332 281 672 380 281 199 n.a n.a n.a
Appendix Table 7.  Carbon Intensity by sector (in tons per million US dollars, 2004)
Direct Intensity















































Agriculture 1.7 1.2 1.1 2.1 1.3 6.2 6.2 13.2 4.3 5.2 14.8 8.9 5.9 8.9 5.3
All energy 3.1 4.0 2.7 5.8 5.2 8.3 7.1 9.8 24.1 9.5 7.7 22.2 23.4 10.6 9.3
All manufacturing 35.3 23.9 31.8 25.9 42.2 33.9 49.8 35.4 23.8 47.5 31.5 24.4 24.3 29.3 41.3
Energy intensive manufacturing 11.1 7.2 10.0 9.2 13.0 11.5 15.7 10.9 10.7 10.7 4.7 8.9 7.4 9.8 12.6
Other manufacturing 24.3 16.8 21.8 16.7 29.1 22.3 34.1 24.5 13.1 36.8 26.8 15.5 16.9 19.5 28.7
Other industries 5.9 7.0 7.5 8.8 6.5 8.9 10.9 8.5 8.5 7.1 8.4 9.0 7.7 7.5 5.4
Service 53.9 63.9 56.9 57.3 44.9 42.8 26.0 33.1 39.3 30.7 37.6 35.5 38.7 43.6 38.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0































Agriculture 0.8 3.7 0.1 4.1 0.1 10.4 1.1 3.7 0.6 1.7 3.4 4.3 1.9 7.9 6.2
All energy 2.5 2.2 0.3 10.0 2.3 4.3 2.0 3.6 52.9 7.1 9.7 24.7 49.4 34.6 17.8
All manufacturing 69.4 69.5 90.3 66.6 77.3 68.5 89.9 69.7 36.0 79.6 70.5 53.0 32.6 37.7 61.4
Energy intensive manufacturing 20.6 19.0 17.5 21.6 16.9 20.6 12.0 19.3 25.4 14.0 4.6 25.7 11.4 17.4 15.0
Other manufacturing 48.8 50.5 72.8 45.1 60.5 47.8 78.0 50.4 10.5 65.6 65.9 27.2 21.2 20.3 46.4
Other industries 1.8 0.9 1.1 3.6 0.2 7.2 0.6 5.0 3.4 1.6 0.7 2.8 1.8 7.4 3.1
Service 25.5 23.8 8.3 15.6 20.0 9.6 6.4 18.0 7.2 10.1 15.8 15.2 14.3 12.5 11.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Appendix Table 9.  Share of Exports by sector (% of total exports, 2005)